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Libel Law in the Twenty-First
Century: Defamation and the
Electronic Newspaper
By STEPHEN R. HOFER*
I.
Introduction
During the decade just past, the American newspaper was trans-
formed.' Although largely unnoticed by the reading public, a tech-
nological revolution was taking place in the industry. This revolu-
tion, its profound impact still only incompletely experienced or
appreciated, already must be said to rival in importance the nine-
teenth century inventions of the linotype and rotary press,' or even
Gutenberg's fifteenth century development of movable type.'
The decade was ushered in by the first widespread use of com-
puterized phototypesetting equipment and the conversion of the
Associated Press and United Press International wire services to
electronic editing systems.' By the mid-1970's, the changeover of
newsrooms to optical character readers (OCRs) and cathode ray
tubes/video display terminals (CRTs/VDTs) had swelled from a
trickle to a torrent.5 As the decade neared an end, - the process of
constructing entire pages, including headlines, text, photographs,
and advertising, and then turning these pages into plates ready for
the printing press, all orchestrated at the computer terminal -
pagination - was nearing reality.6
* A.B., Indiana University, 1976; J.D., Northwestern University, 1980. Member of the
California Bar. Associate with the law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles.
1. See Smith, The Future of the Fourth Estate, ATLAS WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Nov. 1978,
at 21; Smith, All the News That Fits in the Databank, SATURDAY REVIEW, June 23, 1979, at
18; The Silent Newsroom, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1979, at 74.
2. See generally, B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 6-10, 92-96 (1971).
3. Id. See The Silent Newsroom, supra note 1, at 74.
4. See News by Computer, TIME, Dec. 17, 1973, at 64.
5. See Smith, The Future of the Fourth Estate, supra note 1, at 22; The Silent News-
room, supra note 1, at 74.
6. See Smith, All the News That Fits in the Databank, supra note 1, at 18; The Silent
Newsroom, supra note 1, at 75; Doebler, Computer Composition Systems Evolving Rapidly,
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Automation has thus left an indelible impression upon the entire
newspaper production process, making it, in a sense, another
electonic medium. The transformation has, at the same time, radi-
cally altered the working responsibilities of the editor, the reporter,
and the printer. But bigger changes still are yet to come, and it is
these future changes, involving even greater automation and, ulti-
mately, home delivery via television, that can be expected to have
a major influence upon the body of law 'that governs the press in
this country. This article will consider the potential impact of fur-
ther newspaper computerization upon libel law and examine alter-
native approaches courts might utilize in balancing First Amend-
ment press freedoms against the rights of individuals victimized by
computer defamation. In addition, the article will outline the effect
that automation has had on libel law in another field, that of con-
sumer credit reporting, with a view toward determining whether
courts might find precedent there for re-thinking current doctrines
of newspaper defamation as applied to the electronic newspaper.
II.
The Telescreen Newspaper
In the future, informational systems of all different types, rang-
ing from newspapers and television news to library reference ser-
vices, airline timetables, and movie theatre schedules, to name only
a few, can be expected to become more inter-connected in their
preparation, production, and delivery.7 The incredible speed and
storage capacity of the computer makes this development practical
and, indeed, inevitable. But while the computer will facilitate this
metamorphosis, it will be in the home television set that the aver-
age information consumer will actually see the change. It is
through the medium of television, the thirty-year-old rival of the
newspaper,' that, ironically enough, the transformation of newspa-
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Aug. 5, 1974, at 40.
7. See Carne, The Wired Household, IEEE SPECTRUM (published by the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.), Oct. 1979, at 61; Tobin, Computer With the Green
Eyeshade, SATURDAY REVIEW, May 10, 1969, at 70.
8. See Smith, The Future of the Fourth Estate, supra note 1, at 24; Tobin, Computer
With the Green Eyeshade, supra note 7, at 69.
The convergence of newspaper and television technology, after years of competition for
both news and advertising dollars, can be explained in part by this statement made by
Philip Meyer, director of news research for Knight-Ridder Newspapers:
Newspaper companies are buying cable [television companies] because we want
to avoid the classic mistake of rail companies who thought they were in the rail-
road business and found out too late that they were in the transportation busi-
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pers may eventually become a transfiguration.
As computerization of the production process nears completion, 9
newspaper executives have begun to contemplate the next possible
step: automation of the delivery system.10 Delivery by such an au-
tomated system would enable the daily newspaper reader to view
stories, photographs, advertisements, and comic strips, not as a
printed product impressed in ink on paper, but as electronic
images appearing on his television screen. The reader would work
the crossword puzzle in much the same way as a person playing
with the video games already on the market today. And if he
wanted to clip a coupon or save a story for his scrapbook, he would
simply activate a home printer attached to his television receiver.
This is no Flash Gordon fantasy. The electronic or "telescreen"
newspaper, as this article will refer to it, is already in its infancy in
Great Britain," and home information retrieval systems of various
types are the subject of extensive research in France, Japan, Can-
ada, Sweden, Finland, and most recently the United States.12 Ex-
ness. We realize that we are in the information business, not just the newspaper
business.
Sanoff, Electronic Newspapers: Will They Be Here Soon?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
May 11, 1981, at 61. In the same article, Robert Marbut, president of Harte-Hanks Commu-
nications, Inc., was quoted as saying: "The new technology is fast bringing all media into a
common arena. The distinctions . . . that made television different from newspapers are
now blurring." Id.
9. The vast majority of the nation's 1,500 newsrooms were automated during the 1970s.
The Silent Newsroom, supra note 1, at 74.
10. Sanoff, Electronic Newspapers: Will They Be Here Soon?, supra note 8, at 61; B.
BAGDIKIAN, supra note 2, at xxxii-xxxiv. See notes 11, 12 & 20 and accompanying text, infra.
11. See Teletext and Viewdata - A Primer, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 1979, at 63. Merry,
'Newspaper' arrives on English (TV) Channel, Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1980, § 5, at 7,
col. 1. Great Britain today has the most advanced and operational home information re-
trieval systems in the world. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC), the Independent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the British Post Office all now offer such services to a
limited, but rapidly growing number of customers. The BBC system, known as Ceefax, and
the IBA service, known on the commercial television channels as Oracle, both represent
developments of the "teletext" method, see note 13 and accompanying text, infra, and by
mid-1980 could be received by decoders connected to more than 40,000 television sets in the
United Kingdom, up from only 7,000 sets in mid-1979. The Post Office, which also operates
the telephone network in Britain, has developed a "viewdata" system based on telephone
transmission, see note 14 and accompanying text, infra, that is known as Prestel. Initial
Prestel service was offered to London-area customers in March, 1979, and within the first
year 3,000 subscribers, most of them business offices, purchased Prestel sets. A Prestel client
is charged each time he makes use of the system, while the only cost for a teletext user is
when he buys a decoder for an existing set or a new television set specifically designed to
receive teletext. See also Winsbury & Lane, Britain's Electronic Information Service, ATLAS
WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Sept. 1979, at 54.
12. See Teletext and Viewdata - A Primer, supra note 11, at 63. In the United States,
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perimentation has focused primarily on two different delivery
methods, known generically as teletext and viewdata.
In teletext, information is encoded by a digital computer and
then transmitted along with a regular television signal. As part of a
broadcast system, the data can be sent one-way only, but it is
transmitted continuously on a repeating basis, and a decoder at-
tached to the television receiver intercepts the information re-
quested by the viewer as that particular signal rotates past. 3
the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), KSL-TV in Salt Lake City, Utah, and cable tele-
vision suppliers in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Crystal Lake, Illinois, had begun teletext
transmitting experiments as of mid-1979, and both the New York Times Corp. and Dow
Jones & Co. have since announced plans for pilot projects to test reader interest in teletext.
KSL's system was capable of transmitting 800 screen-size "pages" of information, which is
about the equivalent of a 50-page newspaper. See TV Turns to Print, NEWSWEEK, July 30,
1979, at 73.
In early 1980, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. and Southern Bell, an American Tele-
phone and Telegraph subsidiary, began test-marketing the first American viewdata service
in the Miami area. Miami Herald, Nov. 29, 1979, at 17; see Knight-Ridder to Test Home
Electronic Info System, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, April 12, 1980, at 7. Plans for a nationwide,
experimental viewdata system that would enable subscribers to read stories from 11 differ-
ent newspapers from around the country and the Associated Press wire service also were
announced in 1980 by A.P. McCain, Newspapers vs. Computers: The Press Hedges Its Bets,
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 72. The possibility of combining teletext and
viewdata systems in such a way as to take advantage of their various strengths also is being
studied at KSL in Salt Lake City. Robinson & Loveless, "Touch-Tone" Teletext - A Com-
bined Teletext- Viewdata System, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, July,
1979, at 298.
The research being conducted in Sweden and Finland and by Bell Canada is based on the
British Prestel standards. See note 14 and accompanying text, infra. Other viewdata sys-
tems in the experimental stage differ from Prestel and include Captains, a Japanese devel-
opment designed to cope with the complexities of the Katakana alphabet, and Telidon, a
system developed by the Canadian Department of Communications that permits transmis-
sion of images of photographic clarity in addition to more conventional computer graphics.
In France, experimentation is being carried out involving both the teletext and viewdata
methods. Other countries now considering the development of national systems based on
one or more of these techniques include West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Spain.
13. Harden, Teletext/Viewdata LSI, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONSUMER ELECTRONICS,
July, 1979, at 353; Teletext and Viewdata - A Primer, supra note 11, at 63; TV Turns to
Print, supra note 12, at 73. Teletext is possible because the conventional television picture
does not use all of the lines of spectrum space available at any one time. In the United
States, 21 lines (known as the "blanking interval") of the 525 lines being transmitted at any
moment in a television broadcast are reserved for technical purposes; in Great Britain, the
blanking interval takes up 50 lines of a 625-line transmission. Teletext utilizes these blank
lines to send its encoded messages in much the same way that closed captioning systems
already use the blanking interval to send the dialogue of telecasts to viewers with hearing
problems. The teletext data remains invisible on the screen unless a viewer has a decoder
which can replace the regular programming on the screen with the teletext information. The
limited number of lines available in the blanking interval makes it impossible to transmit
large amounts of information because viewers would be forced to wait for excessively long
382 [Vol. 3
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Viewdata, on the other hand, is a two-way interactive system, in
which the decoder is connected to the viewer's telephone line as
well as his television. The user requests the story he wishes to see
by punching buttons on a small keyboard terminal or a modified
pushbutton telephone, and the data is transmitted to the individ-
ual household from a data base connected through the public tele-
phone network."'
As mentioned above, it seems likely that a variety of different
information services will become available through home data re-
trieval systems, including some that do not even exist today. One
possibility is a national electronic "newspaper" designed specifi-
cally for telescreen transmission." Such a national medium could
be realized in the United States through an interconnected net-
work of community access or cable television (CATV) systems and
domestic communications space satellites." The Wall Street Jour-
nal may be the forerunner of such a national newspaper. Tradi-
tionally of interest to a nationwide audience, the Journal has, since
1974, been able to speed delivery to its business-oriented reader-
ship by photocomposing its pages, then transmitting a facsimile
image of the page through computer impulses dispatched via a ge-
osynchronous satellite to regional printing plants. 7 In the future,
the Journal, as well as other newspapers of national importance,
may simply bypass the printing plant and transmit their products
directly to the reader's television set.
Another possible role for the electronic newspaper might be that
of a general repository of local or national information. Both the
serious researcher and the casually curious reader might enjoy
periods of time for requested pages to be transmitted. But if a teletext system used the
entire television signal - on an otherwise unused cable channel, for example - hundreds of
pages could be transmitted simultaneously. See Renner-Smith, Data-Display TV Links
Your Home With Huge Info Banks, POPULAR SCIENCE, January, 1981, at 72.
14. Teletext/Viewdata LSI, supra note 13, at 353; Teletext and Viewdata - A Primer,
supra note 11, at 63.
15. See Gross, Info-Text, Newspaper of the Future, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS, July 1979, at 295.
16. Id. See also Sanoff, Electronic Newspapers: Will They be Here Soon?, supra note 8,
at 61-62.
17. Smith, The Future of the Fourth Estate, supra note 1, at 24. Dow Jones & Co., pub-
lisher of The Wall Street Journal, already has announced plans to begin a teletext experi-
ment in cooperation with the Dallas Morning News. McCain, Newspapers vs. Computers:
The Press Hedges Its Bets, supra, note 12 at 73. And the Gannett Company, the nation's
largest newspaper chain, also is contemplating a system of satellite transmission to printing
plants across the country as a means of establishing a national newspaper. Sanoff, Elec-
tronic Newspapers: Will They be Here Soon?, supra note 8, at 62.
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easy, inexpensive, and instantaneous access to world news, past
and present, via the television computer. The New York Times In-
formation Bank, operational since 1973, is the prototype of such a
system. The Times Bank includes a comprehensive index to every-
thing that has appeared in that newspaper since 1969, plus infor-
mation from more than sixty other publicatons and eight wire ser-
vices. The Bank is expanded constantly through the recordation of
nearly 1,000 new entries each day.19
Experts in this field do not believe that the printed newspaper
will ever be completely abandoned.19 The newspaper printed on
paper has, for the foreseeable future, the obvious advantage of
portability, as well as an historical acceptance that will undoubt-
edly generate initial resistance to a non-printed product. At the
same time, however, problems created by reliance on paper are
growing, including heightened competition from faster electronic
media for advertising and subscriber revenues, steadily increasing
costs of labor, paper, and printing supplies, periodic newsprint
shortages, and growing environmental concern over both the large
amount of solid waste that newspapers generate and the resulting
expense that communities encounter in its disposal.20 If the
problems inherent in the traditional newsprint delivery system are
not alleviated, and there is no indication they will be, then alterna-
tives to the electronic newspaper will continue to grow more at-
tractive. Electronic delivery would offer several advantages both to
newspapers and their subscribers. For the reader, there are the
twin attractions of speed and convenience. For example, a person
interested in a rapidly developing international crisis would be
able to read in depth about the problem as soon as an editor keyed
an edited story into the accessible data base. This would present
all the speed of modern-day broadcasting, along with the detail
that only a traditional newspaper can provide. For the newspapers
- which in many cases have already computerized their billing,
classified and display advertising, newsroom operations, and some
of the composing room functions - telescreening would offer the
18. Timely Times, SATURDAY REVIEW, July 26, 1975, at 8; Smith, The Future of the
Fourth Estate, supra note 1, at 23.
19. Interviews with Michael Kinerk, newsroom systems manager of the Miami Herald,
and Michael Thompson, electronics engineer for the American Newspaper Publishers Asso-
ciation Research Institute (December, 1980). See also B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 2, at xxxiii;
Data Processing: News and More - by Computer, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 18, 1980, at 110.
20. See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 2, at xxxii-xxxvi; Sanoff, Electronic Newspapers: Will
They Be Here Soon?, supra note 8, at 61.
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opportunity for substantial economic savings by further reducing
dependence on costly manpower and eliminating the time and
transportation problems presented by large circulation delivery
areas." The advantages that computerization offers in contending
with the present-day problems of traditional newspapers seem to
make the electronic newspaper virtually inevitable." One expert
now actively involved in telescreen research says, "At some point
in the 21st century, television will certainly become the predomi-
nant newspaper delivery mode."2 3
This introduction to the computerized future of the newspaper
industry suggests a number of possible legal questions that such
technological change will raise. Indeed, the legal implications of
electronic newspapers are wide-ranging, notwithstanding the tradi-
tional freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the press under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Questions that
21. Id.
22. The biggest barrier to widespread development of the electronic newspaper in the
immediate future is the cost of automation, both to newspaper publishers and to consumers.
Smith, The Future of the Fourth Estate, supra note 1, at 24; Sanoff, Electronic Newspa-
pers: Will They Be Here Soon?, supra note 8, at 61; TV Turns to Print, supra note 12, at
74-75; Data Processing: News and More - by Computer, supra note 19, at 106. The initial
capital outlay will involve millions of dollars and only the largest newspaper chains or cor-
porations, such as Knight-Ridder, Gannett, and the Los Angeles-based Times-Mirror Cor-
poration, have the financial resources to attempt such a major undertaking on their own.
Once the technological facilities are in place, however, it will be much less costly for smaller
newspapers to enter the electronic field.
Consumers also will be faced with large initial expenses including the cost of a decoder for
a teletext system or user line charges for a viewdata operation. For example, as of mid-1980,
a teletext-equipped color television set cost $1,100 in Great Britain, or $450 more than a
comparable set without teletext capacity. 'Newspaper' arrives on English (TV) Channel,
supra note 11. Once decoders go into mass production, however, it is predicted they will add
only about $50 to the cost of a new television set, while conversion of an existing set will run
about $150. User charges are also expected to decrease. TV Turns to Print, supra note 12,
at 74-75.
Despite the huge start-up costs involved, experts such as George Minot, senior vice presi-
dent of the Columbus, Ohio-based firm of CompuServe, believe that after the initial ex-
penses are incurred, costs will decline very rapidly. Supporters of electronic newspapers also
point out that the expenses associated with the existing system of paper delivery are in-
creasing dramatically and these costs also will tend to make the electronic system more
competitive with the printed form.
23. Interview with Michael Kinerk (December, 1980), supra note 19.
24. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This simple
commandment has been interpreted over the years to include specific protection for news
gathering by the press, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[Wlithout some pro-
tection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated"), and the edito-
rial process, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("The choice
of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
No. 3] 385
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will no doubt arise include: Will the delivery system be regulated,
and if so will it be as a common carrier or as a broadcaster? What
impact will antitrust and unfair competition law have on system
ownership and operation? What copyright protection will be af-
forded "electronic newspaper stores?" How will the new technol-
ogy affect the right of privacy? And what will occur in the area of
defamation law as a result of the developing technology? The re-
mainder of this article will address only the last of these questions,
dealing with defamation. The other questions, while deserving ex-
tended scholarly attention, will not be dealt with here.
The Electronic Newspaper's Impact upon the
Elements of Libel
Defamation, whether by libel or slander, and regardless of the
means of communication utilized, involves certain legal elements
that must be proved in order to establish liability. These elements,
according to the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts, include:
(1) A false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(2) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the pub-
lisher; and
(4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication."
There is no reason to believe that the changeover of newspapers
from printed delivery to electronic transmission would have any
impact upon the first and fundamental requirement that the plain-
tiff prove the existence of a false and defamatory statement. As to
the other elements, however, the development of the electronic
newspaper may necessitate some reconsideration of what defama-
tion is and how it is proved.
The second element involves what is known as "publication."
The legal meaning of the word publication is different from the
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or
unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press . . . .").
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). See also B. SANFORD, SYNOPSIS OF THE
LAW OF LIBEL AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 8-9 (1977). With the exception of fault, the ele-
ments of defamation are the outgrowth of centuries of common law development. The re-
quirement of fault in cases involving the press, which ended strict liability for libel as ap-
plied to news media, was first imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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definition commonly applied to that word by journalists or the
general public. At law, publication is defined as the dissemination
of defamatory material to a third person who comprehends the de-
famatory nature of the communication and is capable of identify-
ing the plaintiff as the subject of the defamation. 6 Any means of
communication that conveys the defamatory idea is sufficient to
effect a publication: defamation need not be printed or written in
order to have been published. A libelous communication can be
conveyed by the exhibition of a picture," and courts repeatedly
have held that words spoken on radio or television broadcasts can
constitute defamatory publication." Given the wide variety of me-
26. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMA-
TION § 36 (1978).
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 113; A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS § 68 (1969);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, Comment a (1977).
28. Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936); Louka v. Park Entertain-
ments, 294 Mass. 268, 1 N.E.2d 41 (1936).
29. While several courts have addressed the issue of defamation through radio or televi-
sion, it is not entirely clear whether such defamation constitutes libel or slander, although
the trend is to treat it as libel. See Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476
(1956), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957), appeal denied, 5 App. Div. 2d
768, 170 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958). The two forms of defamation traditionally have been distin-
guished by their form of transmission, libel generally being written and slander generally
being oral. The traditional rationale for this distinction lies in the less permanent nature of
the spoken word and its more limited area of dissemination. The modern characteristics of
electronic broadcasting, however, render these differences practically meaningless. The regu-
lations of the Federal Communications Commission require licensees to maintain records of
everything they broadcast and one of the ways in which this requirement is fulfilled is by
keeping scripts, videotapes, and other recordings of everything that is transmitted. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.111, 73.281, 73.581, 73.622, 73.669. Furthermore, statistics demonstrate that the audi-
ence for national network broadcasts over radio or television far exceeds the circulation of
the largest newspapers and magazines. In any case, all courts appear to agree that if a de-
famatory broadcast is read from a script and not ad-libbed, then the script already contains
a libel, and republication of the libel by reading it over the air is itself a libel. See, e.g.,
Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958);
Sargent v. National Broadcasting Co., 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Hartmann v. Win-
chell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947); Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 205 Misc.
357, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1954), af'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1955); Gibler v.
Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958).
In Shor v. Billingsley, the court held that a defamation action sounded in libel rather
than slander even though the defamatory dialogue was not read from a prepared script, the
judge reasoning that broadcasting's vast and far-flung audience made defamatory utterances
as potentially harmful to a person's reputation as a publication by writing, and that "perma-
nence of form" was not a necessary prerequisite to libel. 4 Misc. 2d at 864, 158 N.Y.S.2d at
484. Section 358, Comment f, of the American Law Institute's First Restatement of Law of
Torts, published in 1938, provided that a broadcast defamation was to be libel if read from
a prepared script or notes and that extemporaneous comments might be either libel or slan-
der depending on such factors as the area of dissemination and the premeditation involved.
The Second Restatement of the Law of Torts, published in 1977, abandoned this largely
unworkable distinction, and § 568A states that all broadcast defamations are to be treated
No. 3] 387
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dia through which a defamation can be published, it appears cer-
tain that the transfer of newspaper stories from the printed page
to the television screen would not affect a court's finding that the
publication requirement had been met.
It can be argued, of course, that words glowing momentarily on a
TV screen lack the permanence associated with the printed word.
In the early days of broadcasting, attorneys for radio stations at-
tempted to draw a similar distinction, arguing that oral defama-
tions by their clients should be treated as slander rather than li-
bel.80 In the case of printed information being displayed on a
television screen, however, the distinction is neither particularly
accurate, nor especially relevant from a legal perspective.81 The
visual nature of the publication, the capacity for permanent stor-
age of the information, and the potential for tremendous impact
and injury all lead to the conclusion that defamation in the elec-
as libel, regardless of whether they are read from a script. State statutes generally have
avoided the issue by referring only to "broadcast defamation."
In California, two lower court decisions have held that broadcast defamation is treated as
slander in that state, but in neither case was the defamation read from a script. Arno v.
Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966); White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d
243, 44 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1965). A Georgia court coined the word "defamacast" in order to
avoid having to call the defamation either libel or slander, but the defendant was held to
liability standards appropriate to libel. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v.
Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962).
The legal nature of transmissions of printed texts displayed visually on television has not
been litigated so far, but it seems clear from the precedential distinctions based on the use
of scripts that defamation in such transmissions would be treated as libel.
The distinction between libel and slander is important in the development of this new
technology because it is generally easier for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action for libel
than for slander. This is because a person who believes himself to have been slandered can-
not recover unless he demonstrates that he has suffered "special damages" (actual pecuniary
loss) or that the slanderous statement falls into one of four traditional, specific, and limited
categories. One state supreme court has said, "[T]he scope of liability is greater for libel,
and the pleading requirements are less strict." Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 970 (Del.
1978).
30. As noted in note 29, supra, the court in Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 864, 158
N.Y.S.2d 476, 484 (1956), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957), appeal de-
nied, 5 App. Div.. 2d 768, 170 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958), ruled, inter alia, that "'permanence of
form' is not necessarily a prerequisite to a libel." A commentator later suggested that this
interpretation was correct and that a libel would remain so even if the script from which it
was read was later destroyed and the writing had thus "dissolved." Note, Torts: Defama-
tion: Libel-Slander Distinction, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 320, 324 (1957). More recently, it has been
suggested that a similar rule would apply to defamatory messages read on a computer video
display screen and then returned to storage. Stevens & Hoffman, Tort Liability for Defama-
tion by Computer, 6 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 91, 93 n.11 (1977). California Civil Code
section 46 defines slander as "a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also
communications by radio or any mechanical or other means . . .
31. See notes 29 and 30, supra.
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tronic newspaper will be treated as published -libel. First of all,
even momentary viewing is legally sufficient for publication as long
as the defamatory meaning is communicated and comprehended.
One court has said that whenever a defamation is "designed for
visual perception," it is a libel." Furthermore, several technologi-
cal aids will be associated with the telescreen newspaper that will
contribute to its permanence. It can be assumed that as time
passes more advanced television receivers will have connected
home printers that will enable the viewer to obtain, if he wishes,
printouts of the stories he has seen on the screen. Even if the
viewer has no desire to secure a printout, the libelous story will
remain in the data base until transferred or erased, and thus could
be called back to the screen repeatedly. 3 The telescreen viewer
also may have a "stop-action" capacity in his set that will enable
him to "freeze" particular passages on the screen for more compre-
hensive examination. Finally, even after a story is cleared out of a
currently active and immediately accessible data base, newspapers
still will undoubtedly utilize some sort of data storage capacity -
since they have for more than a century kept bound volumes of old
issues and topically indexed folders of clippings filed away in a
"morgue" - that will lend additional permanence to each day's
computerized product. Indeed, future data storage methods will
probably allow easier access than those utilized today, and this
easier accessibility might cause further problems in the case of
computerized defamations that previously had appeared in the
newspaper. This possibility will be considered in greater detail in
the discussion of remedies below.
While it is unlikely that the changeover of newspapers to elec-
tronic transmission will affect the publication requirement in defa-
mation actions, it is conceivable that this conversion could have a
legal impact on the third and fourth. elements of defamation men-
tioned above, those being fault and injury.
Under the common law system, all American jurisdictions pre-
sumed general damages for libel on its face, or libel per se,"
32. Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (1965).
33. Stevens & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 93 n.11.
34. Libel per se or libel on its face is a statement that is defamatory without requiring
any extrinsic facts in order to show that a defamatory meaning was conveyed; that is, it is
injurious to reputation on its face. Libel per se differs from libel per quod in that a state-
ment that is libelous in the latter sense becomes defamatory only when the third-party re-
cipient is in possession of extrinsic knowledge that gives the communication a libelous
meaning. Libel per quod will not support a cause of action unless the plaintiff can offer
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merely from the fact of publication." But the law in the area of
libel injury has been evolving ever since the Supreme Court's revo-
lutionary 1964 decision regarding the constitutional privilege of the
press in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan." That case and its prog-
eny have left the elements of fault and injury inextricably inter-
twined. Currently, it can be said that there is no presumption of
damages in a libel action brought against an institution of the
press if the plaintiff is a private person (i.e., not a public figure),
and the media defendant does not violate the New York Times
standard for actual malice: whether the publication was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity." If actual malice is demonstrated, by any plaintiff, courts
may award presumed or punitive damages." If, on the other hand,
a private plaintiff merely proves negligence on the part of the news
medium that does not rise to the level of actual malice, he can
recover damages only if he can show "actual injury." 9 Actual in-
jury has not been defined by the Court, although it has said that
such injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss, but can also in-
clude loss of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish." There must be "competent evidence" of this injury" -
although it need not be assigned an actual dollar figure" - and it
is in this area that computer data on story usage could have an
impact on a court's determination of damages. If a newspaper built
its new delivery system around the viewdata method or any other
type of interactive data retrieval system, records could be main-
tained as to the number of times any story was called for by view-
ers. This sort of access information would offer a far more reliable
indication of how many people had seen the libel than could the
gross circulation figures compiled by newspapers today. Courts
might permit evidentiary discovery of such access records, thus en-
abling the trier of fact to quantify better either impairment of rep-
utation or loss of standing in the community by more accurately
proof of "special damages," i.e., actual pecuniary loss. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 112.
35. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977); L.
Eldridge, supra note 26, § 95 at 537.
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 279-80. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452-57 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-50 (1974).
38. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 349-50.
41. Id. at 350.
42. Id.; see 424 U.S. at 460.
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determining the actual extent of defamatory publication. Hence,
the resulting amount of recoverable damages could more accu-
rately reflect the actual harm done.
At early common law, every repetition of a defamation consti-
tuted a new publication or "republication" and gave rise to a sepa-
rate and additional cause of action.4 3 This rule, carried to its ex-
treme, would have made a newspaper with a circulation of 200,000
copies potentially liable for 200,000 separate counts of libel in a
civil action. To avoid such a harsh result, most American courts
have adopted the "single publication" rule, under which an entire
edition of a newspaper or other periodical is generally treated as
only one publication for legal purposes." The single publication
rule was codified by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
the Uniform Single Publication Act," and was written into both
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 113. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117
Eng. Rep. 75 (1849), was the case that first established this doctrine. Despite the develop-
ment of the single publication rule, the Duke of Brunswick holding has not lost all of its
vitality. See Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 325 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 432
U.S. 911 (1977); Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 162 Mont. 401, 512 P.2d 702 (1973).
44. The single publication rule first began to take form in an 1892 decision of the New
York Court of Appeals involving repetition of a slander, Enos v. Enos, 135 N.Y. 609, 32 N.E.
123 (1892). Its further development can be traced in a series of late 19th century and early
20th-century cases, including Galligan v. Sun Printing & Publication Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 54
N.Y.S. 471 (1898); Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1907) (Graves,
J., dissenting); Murray v. Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S.W. 1011 (1908); and Age-Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921).
A New York court expanded the concept in Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254
A.D. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938), aff'd, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939), when it ruled
that a two-year statute of limitations was not extended in the plaintiff's favor because a
third party had seen the allegedly defamatory material while examining bound volumes of
prior issues in the defendant's newspaper office more than a year after the story originally
had been published. But cf. Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 252
(N.D. Ill. 1945), in which the court disputed the Wolfson rationale in factual situations in
which a publisher reprints a prior issue or, subsequent to the original distribution, sells
unsold copies of the issue containing a libel. "The publisher of a libel has it entirely within
his own control as to his actions with reference therdto. . . . [I]f the publisher chooses to
subsequently sell unsold copies of the magazine containing the libel, then the publisher by
his own act has chosen to again send out to the public the magazine containing the libel."
The question that would be raised in the case of a computerized and publicly accessible
newspaper morgue would be to what extent did the publishing company have morgue usage
within its control. This would depend, in part, on what alternative sources a user might have
available for obtaining access to the morgue (e.g., a public library's separate storage system
if such a data base stood separately from the newspaper's), or whether a morgue was part of
an overall community information system, such as the British Prestel system.
45. The Uniform Single Publications Act, adopted in 1952 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provides in Section 1 as follows:
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or
slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publica-
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the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts and the Second Re-
statement of Coiflict of Laws."
Such a rule is adequate to deal with a situation in which today's
libel disappears into dusty bound volumes or envelopes of clip-
pings and seldom if ever again sees the light of day. However, a
rather different problem is presented when a newspaper "morgue"
becomes more readily accessible to readers who can call up past
stories for home viewing merely by typing in commands on a ter-
minal keyboard. Compounding the impact of such simple recall is
the likelihood that morgues throughout the country will be inter-
connected as part of a national information network." Problems
will arise if there are conflicts of laws between different jurisdic-
tions as a result of such interstate republication. The uncertain ap-
plicability of statutes of limitations also will create difficulties."
tion or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or
magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio
or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action
shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all
jurisdictions.
The Uniform Single Publications Act has been enacted in seven states: ARIz. REV. STAT, §
12-651; CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3425.1; IDAHO CODE § 6-702; ILL REV. STAT. Ch. 126, §§ 11 to 15.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-7-1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-10; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8341. Although
the Uniform Act itself has been adopted in only seven states, the general rule concerning
single publication liability is observed in the majority of jurisdictions. W. PROSSER, supra
note 26, § 113.
A close reading of Uniform Single Publications Act Section 1 makes it apparent that the
statute is not as all-protective as might be assumed from its title. Even in jurisdictions that
have adopted the Act, its language would not protect a news or entertainment medium from
additional liability where the libel is published in each of the different daily editions of a
metropolitan newspaper, or in the rebroadcast of a particular program on radio or television,
or in the continuous repetition of a motion picture in theatres. A contrary result was
reached in Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1966),
but it must be observed that the California Legislature had changed the wording of the
Uniform Act from "edition" to "issue" in the clause concerning newspapers, and the court
took note of this change in reaching its result. Id. at 287-89, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 628. In Cox
Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilreath, 142 Ga. App. 297, 235 S.E.2d 633 (1977), a Georgia court of
appeals held that an alleged libel published in four different editions of the Atlanta Consti-
tution created four different causes of action. Georgia has not adopted the Uniform Single
Publications Act, but it does have a similar single publications rule contained within its
statutes and the policy also is encompassed in the common law of the state. Id., 235 S.E.2d
at 634.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 577A (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 150, 153 (1969).
47. See note 44, supra.
48. Interview with Michael Kinerk (December, 1980) supra note 19. See also Tobin, Com-
puter With the Green Eyeshade, supra note 7, at 69.
49. W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 113; L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, § 38; Prosser, Inter-
state Publication, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 959 (1953).
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Given such circumstances, it will undoubtedly be difficult, if not
impossible, to "keep a good libel down." The single publication
rule, by itself, will be inadequate to protect both the injured and
responsible parties in a computer-era telescreen libel action. Other
remedies must thus be considered.
III.
The Electronic Newspaper's Impact upon Remedies
For Libel
The traditional remedy for defamation has been an action at law
for damages. It has often been said that "a court of equity will not
enjoin the publication of a libel" 0 on the rationale that damages
afford an adequate remedy for libel and thus, under traditional
common law rules, preclude any sort of equitable relief.51 This rule
owes its origin to early nineteenth century English law,52 but has
50. Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F.2d 963, 964 (7th
Cir. 1927).
51. See, e.g., Willis v. O'Connell, 231 F. 1004, 1014-16 (S.D. Ala. 1916); Kuhn v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497,
81 S.E.2d 237 (1954).
52. The rule was first enunciated as dictum in Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
Lord Chancellor Eldon, in reaching his decision in Gee, stated that equity would not enjoin
publication because libelous publication was a crime, and equity had no jurisdiction to pre-
vent the commission of crimes. Having said this, however, the Lord Chancellor still granted
the injunction because he found the plaintiff, who was the writer of some letters that had
been delivered to the defendant, to have a sufficient property interest in rights of property
and privacy derived from his authorship of the letters. It thus must be said, as Dean Pound
perceived, that Gee is a weak foundation for the far-sweeping rule banning equitable relief
for defamation. See Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personal-
ity, 29 HARv. L. REv. 640 (1916).
The dictum in Gee actually had a greater long-term impact in the United States than it
did in England. During the mid 19th-century, British courts disagreed over the question of
whether equity could enjoin a libel. Dixon v. Holden, L.R. 7 Eq. 488 (1869), granting an
injunction against a knowingly false publication which stated that the plaintiff had de-
frauded creditors; Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L.R. 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875), denying
injunction to plaintiff who claimed that certain statements made about its insurance premi-
ums in a pamphlet published by defendant were untrue. At about the same time, Parlia-
ment was enacting legislation which made the granting of equitable relief by common law
courts easier. Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, §§ 79, 81, 82;
Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 16). After some uncertainty, the English
courts began abandoning the Gee prohibition of injunctive relief for libel. Initially, it was
held that continued publication could be enjoined once a jury had found material to be
libelous. Saxby v. Easterbrook and Hannaford, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 339 (1878). Later, it was also
held that courts could grant interlocutory injunctions even where a jury had not yet decided
the question of libel, although this power was to be exercised with great caution and only in
cases where the court found clear evidence of defamation. Bonnard v. Perryman, [18911 2
Ch. D. 269; Liverpool Household Stores Ass'n v. Smith, L.R. 37 Ch. D. 170 (1887); Quartz
Hill Co. v. Beall, L.R. 20 Ch. D. 501 (1882). Other notable decisions include: Hayward & Co.
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taken deep root in American soil, fertilized by the strict command-
ment of the First Amendment." The Supreme Court has on occa-
sion stated that defamation is a form of speech that is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment," but these pronouncements
predate the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and there
is some question about their continuing validity."5 For the most
part, courts are extremely sensitive to the constitutionally imposed
prohibition against prior restraints on free speech and free press,
and guard against that spectre." It would seem, however, that
v. Hayward & Sons, 34 Ch. D. 198 (1886) (injunction against trade libel granted even though
plaintiff had shown no evidence of damages); Kerr v. Gandy, 3 T.L.R. 75 (1886) (enjoining
continued publication of a newspaper advertisement); Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864
(1880) (perpetual injunction against trade libel), and Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam,
14 Ch. D. 763 (1880) (enjoining trade libel). The final step taken by the English courts was
their decision that there was no logical distinction between the granting of injunctions in
cases involving defamation of trade or property and cases involving defamation of character
or personality. See note 71, infra.
53. A. HANSON, supra, note 27, § 170.
In 1839, 92 years before the First Amendment was applied to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, New York's Chancellor Walworth said that the power to enjoin libel
"cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal consistently with the principles of a free govern-
ment." Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (1839). In Brandreth, although Chancellor
Walworth also sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that equity protects prop-
erty rights but not personal rights, citing Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, for the latter
proposition, it was the reference to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and
of the press that made this case an American judicial landmark. Brandreth still retains
vitality and is regularly cited. See, e.g., Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200,
205 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
54. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
55. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979) ("Until New York Times, the prevail-
ing jurisprudence was that '[1]ibelous utterances [are not] within the area of constitutionally
protected speech . . . '") and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("[T]his
Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood"). But cf.
Gertz, id. at 340 ("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.").
56. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
The U.S. Supreme Court has never said that injunctive relief is per se unconstitutional in
the context of free speech or press rights. However, the Court has said that the prior re-
straint of speech - that is, the enjoining or prohibition of speech prior to its initial publica-
tion - is "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 559. A plaintiff seeking to impose a
prior restraint bears a "heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). In the con-
text of a publication that threatens national security, the party seeking to enjoin publication
must show that it will suffer serious and irreparable injury. New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. at 726.27, 730. It should be remembered, however, that the emphasis of
these cases is upon prior restraint, and none of the holdings addresses the question of
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there is a difference between attempts to enjoin defamation before
the initial circulation to the public and a later effort aimed at
preventing continuing distribution of material already adjudged
defamatory. 7 Such a difference might well be of constitutional
dimensions.
The First Amendment notwithstanding, courts already have ac-
knowledged the power to grant injunctions against continuing def-
amation in a variety of contexts, including:
- the posting of a libelous roadside billboard that falsely al-
leged that poisons from an industrial plant had killed cattle and
endangered humans;8
- writing on the side of an automobile which blamed an auto
dealership for alleged failure to repair the vehicle;'
- picketing of a builder's housing development;eo
- false and defamatory statements made by a former stock-
holder in a private hospital corporation concerning his ex-busi-
ness partner; 1
- defamatory press releases and other remarks made by a
state attorney general concerning the defendants in an unfair
trade practices prosecution prior to the trial of that case;"
- false, malicious, and defamatory statements made by a
newspaper and other defendants in an effort to persuade the de-
positors of a trust company to boycott the trust company because
of its allegedly incompetent management;8
whether continued publication of material already found to be libelous might be enjoined.
57. See A. HANSON, supra note 27, § 170.
58. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Or. 1963), appeal dismissed, 336
F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964).
59. Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937).
60. West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, appeal dis-
missed, 10 A.D. 2d 1002, 205 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1960).
61. Wolf v. Gold, 9 A.D.2d 257, 193 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1959); rehearing and appeal denied, 10
A.D.2d 561, 196 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1960).
62. Shevin v. Thuotte, 339 So. 2d 253 (Fla. App. 1976).
63. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923).
This is the only appellate decision noted in which a media institution was enjoined from
continued publication of allegedly defamatory material, and it must be emphasized that the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed itself primarily to the injury suffered
by the trust company as a result of the newspaper articles that had been published, rather
than their libelous character as such. At one point, the court states that the complaint does
not contain allegations that any of the articles are libelous in character "for which special
damages are claimed." However, the opinion then quotes some of the allegations, including
a charge that the defendants had made and circulated "false, malicious, misleading and
defamatory statements of and concerning the business and credit" of the trust company. Id.
at 265, 139 N.E. at 655-56. Apparently the court's initial statement meant that the defama-
tion, if any, was libel per quod, provable only by a showing of special damages, and not libel
per se. The court conluded "[ilt is manifest that a case is stated of intentional disparage-
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- an ex-husband's harassment of his former wife through let-
ters, pamphlets and slanderous statements;" and
- a former lover's harassment of his one-time girlfriend
through statements made to the woman's new fiance and to the
police, in addition to physical assaults."
A federal judge, commenting on the general rule that prohibits the en-
joining of defamation, wrote:
Even though as of today the majority American rule [is against
the enjoining of defamatory publications] as stated by [Robert E.]
Hicks [Corp. v. Nat'l Salesmen's Training Ass'n]. . . neverthe-
less, when that rule or decision is . . . recognized to be without
logic, reason and justification in justice, fair dealings and equity,
or any other bases for continued existence in modern commerce,
it is a judicial necessity that the rule be cut down and discarded."
It may be noted that many, although not all, of these decisions
involve actions brought to enjoin trade libel, and that they predate
the Supreme Court's rulings in recent years that commercial
speech is entitled, in certain circumstances, to at least some of the
First Amendment protection enjoyed by other forms of speech.6 7
Such an observation in no way negates the earlier conclusion that
plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief from continuing defamation af-
ter its initial publication, nor suggests that such relief should be
limited only to defamations affecting business interests. 8 Ameri-
can courts have enjoined violations of the personal right of privacy
in cases unrelated to business or commerce," and English courts,
ment of the plaintifs business by false and misleading statements published by the defen-
dant company . . . ." Id. at 266, 139 N.E. at 656. This is obviously a finding of trade libel,
although described by its alternate name of disparagement.
64. Dickson v. Dickson, 12 Wash. App. 183, 529 P.2d 476 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
832, reh. denied, 423 U.S. 991 (1975).
65. Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
66. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 983 (D. Or. 1963), appeal dismissed,
336 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), af'd, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing Robert E. Hicks Corp. v.
Nat'l Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1927)).
67. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court has taken the position
that commercial speech which communicates useful information to the public is entitled to
more First Amendment protection than speech proposing a commercial transaction only.
68. See A. HANSON, supra note 27, § 170; Pound, supra note 52; Note, Developments in
the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994 (1965).
69. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall,
224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103
N.E. 1108 (1913); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Philadelphia Co. C.P. 1940).
See also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and Hansen v. High Society,
5 Med. L. Rptr. 2398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), both recognizing a plaintiffs right to injunctive
relief prohibiting further distribution of a magazine where it contained material that consti-
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which long ago abandoned the rule prohibiting the enjoining of li-
bel,7 0 also have discarded the distinction between defamations af-
fecting trade or property rights and those involving character or
personality alone."
In one case that did not involve any sort of commercial or trade
libel, a Washington state appellate court clearly acknowledged that
the First Amendment was affected by the injunction under review,
but then still upheld the enjoining of a libel. In Dickson v. Dick-
son,72 the court stated that First Amendment rights are not abso-
lute and endorsed a balancing test where other rights also were
implicated. The court then said: "If the First Amendment right is
not deemed paramount, injunctive relief is appropriate if there is
no adequate remedy at law,"7 and concluded that, given the cir-
cumstances of the case,7 the injunction under review did not deny
the defendant his First Amendment rights.
Of the cases discussed above, only one involved a newspaper or
other agency of the organized news media, and that decision, ren-
dered in 1923, focuses on disparagement rather than libel.75 Fur-
thermore, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its decisions thus far con-
cerning attempts to impose equitable remedies upon newspapers,
has held such actions to be violative of the First Amendment.
These Supreme Court rulings, however, have dealt either with at-
tuted an appropriation of the plaintiff's right to publicity. Both decisions were based upon
New York statutes that protect against invasion of privacy, and the Ali decision was also
grounded upon the common law right of privacy.
70. See note 52, supra.
71. See Monson v. Madame Tussauds, Ltd., [1894] 1 Q.B. 671, 690, L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 63, 454,
466. (Lord Halsbury: "Something was said as to the procedure being only applicable to
trade libels. I think the suggestion is quite unfounded. . . . [W]hatever may have been the
interest of such discussions, the Judicature Acts have rendered all of them idle. In all cases
where the Court shall think it just and convenient, the remedy [of injunction] exists. I
should have thought the protection of a man's character much more important than the
protection of his trade.") Id. at 698, L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 63 at 471. (Lord Justice Davey: "I see no
logical distinction for this purpose between a case of libel affecting trade or property and
one affecting character only.") Also, Dunlop v. Dunlop Rubber Co., [1920] 1 I.R. 280, 310
(Judge Powell: "[I]t appears to me to be plain that a Judge . .. has jurisdiction to hear and
determine whether or not an injunction should be granted to restrain the publication of
libel, even though the libel is not alleged to be injurious to trade, and that in the exercise of
this jurisdiction there is no logical distinction between a case of libel affecting trade or prop-
erty and one affecting character only."); R. Mc EWEN & P. LEwis, GATLEY ON LImEL AND,
SLANDER, 11 1379, n.81 (7th ed. 1974).
72. 12 Wash. App. 183, 529 P.2d 476 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
73. 12 Wash. App. at 187, 529 P.2d at 478.
74. See text accompanying note 64, supra.
75. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655 (1923).
See note 63 and accompanying text, supra.
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tempts to prohibit initial publication through legislative or judicial
prior restraints,7 or with a legislatively enacted right-of-reply stat-
ute that the Court found interfered with the editorial freedom of
newspaper publishers.77 While accepting the wisdom of these hold-
ings, it still does not seem that the First Amendment would pro-
hibit an equitable remedy imposed upon a telescreen newspaper, if
it were tailored to fit constitutional limitations.
Although today's technology would permit many types of change
in the storage media containing the memory of previous editions, it
is extremely doubtful that judges ever could, or would, order a de-
famatory story to be completely erased, or even altered." Such a
suggestion is utterly repulsive in light of the American tradition of
First Amendment press freedom and brings to mind this harrowing
passage from the terrifying novel, 1984:
The messages he had received referred to articles or news items
which for one reason or another it was thought necessary to alter,
or, as the official phrase had it, to rectify . . . . This process of
continuous alteration was applied not only to nlwspapers, but to
books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, films, sound
tracks, cartoons, photographs - to every kind of literature or
documentation which might conceivably hold any political or ide-
ological significance.. .. In this way every prediction made by
the Party could be shown by documentary evidence to have been
76. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In these cases, the initial right to circulate information to
the public was affected. This article should not be understood to support any suggestion
that any such initial prohibition of the electronic publication of a libel could or should be
constitutionally upheld.
77. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Tornillo, a state law
required a newspaper to publish a response from a political candidate to the newspaper's
own editorial opinions. The initial right to circulate information also was involved here,
because the required reply had to appear in all copies of an edition of the newspaper, in
derogation of the newspaper staffs editorial decisions as to what materials should appear in
its publication. The Supreme Court held that this right-of-reply statute forced newspapers
to print replies not only to statements claimed to be factually erroneous, but also to edito-
rial opinions of the newspaper. In addition, the statute permitted private parties to demand
the right of reply without any prior judicial determination of error or fault. For these rea-
sons, the statute could not stand.
78. There are a few precomputer era decisions in which courts have held that a party was
under an affirmative duty to remove a defamatory publication made by another, as in the
case of a defendant's bulletin board that was being used to communicate a libelous message.
See Byrne v. Deane, 1 K.B. Div. 818 (1937). Accord, Fogg v. Boston & Lowell Railroad
Corp., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109 (1889); Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268, 17
N.W. 387 (1883). See also W. PROSSER, 8upra note 26, § 113. None of these decisions in-
volves the press, and they do not raise the serious First Amendment concerns that an order
to remove a clipping or story from a newspaper's records would raise.
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correct; nor was any item of news, or any expression of opinion,
which conflicted with the needs of the moment, ever allowed to
remain on record. All history was a palimpsest, scraped clean and
reinscribed exactly as often as was necessary."
If the proposed scope of equitable relief is narrowed, however, it
may be possible to imagine an acceptable system of correction. One
such remedy might take the form of an order prohibiting further
republication of the already published material, now found to be
defamatory, without prior court approval. Another more interest-
ing and perhaps more accqptable possibility might be a require-
ment that notice of the judicial determination be placed into the
data base. 0 This relief probably could not be extended to the
point of requiring the electronic newspaper to publish in a current
edition available by transmission to its entire readership the fact
that a court of law had determined that previously published ma-
terial was defamatory. Such a decree would likely run afoul of the
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo81 and judicial interference with the on-going editorial
process would probably find no more favor than did the legislative
mandate in that case. At the same time, however, remedial action
involving only a limited supplementing of the original publication
would stand a better chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny.
Under this latter approach, an equitable remedy might involve
an order that some sort of new entry be added to the magnetic
tape or other storage media at the original location of the defama-
tory article, explaining that the publication had been found by a
court of law to be libelous and detailing the reasons for that hold-
ing.8 2 Because permanent corrections of this sort could be made in
79. G. ORWELL, 1984, at 39-41 (1949).
80. The reason why this second alternative might be more acceptable than the first is that
it would not prevent recirculation of the defamatory material. Even if a telescreen article
already had been found to be libelous, a newspaper's editors might still feel they had some
overriding reason that justified republication. If the newspaper is willing to accept the po-
tential consequences, including the possibility of a second adverse judgment and assessment
of punitive damages, it perhaps should be the First Amendment right of the editors to take
such a risk.
81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
82. Such a remedy would serve a function somewhat similar to that of the present-day
newspaper retraction, although it should be remembered that under current legal doctrine
and statutory enactments, retraction is not a defense to, or a remedy in a libel action, but
may only mitigate damages. Werner v. Southern California Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d
121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 910 (1951); CAL. CIv. CODE § 48a
(Deering 1971); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (Vernon 1958). See A. HANSON, supra
note 27, §§ 180, 183, 195; B. SANFORD, supra note 25, at 22.
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data bases with relative ease and without necessitating current or
further alterations, there is little reason to fear legal interference
with the editorial process or judicial rewriting of newspaper
records. And because there will likely be fewer post-publication
storage tapes in existence than the large number of bound volumes
kept in scattered locations today, and these tapes will probably be
housed in a smaller number of storage sites, it will be easier for a
court to confirm that there has been compliance with its order in
equity. Finally, given the easy accessibility to computerized
morgues that remote terminals will provide, and the resulting like-
lihood of greater morgue use, it would seem that such a remedy,
when combined with compensatory damages, will compensate a de-
famed plaintiff more adequately than damages alone. Such com-
plete relief is one of the traditional purposes of equity.
Of course, editors and attorneys representing computerized
newspapers in the future will have an important role to play in
seeing that any system of inserting notice of a judicial finding of
libel into newspaper records is applied in a constitutional manner.
These editors and attorneys will have to insist zealously that
changes never be ordered in a data base for any sort of political or
ideological reason. The distinctions drawn by the Supreme Court
in recent years between public figures and private citizens" might
actually work to the benefit of the media in pressing this argu-
ment. At the same time, however, courts will have a responsibility
to act with sensitivity in balancing press freedoms against the
harm that could be done by the perpetual retention of an uncor-
rected libel in easily accessible computer files. In this context, it is
worth considering the recent legislative and judicial responses to
the problem of erroneous and libelous computer records main-
tained by credit reporting agencies.
IV.
Computer Usage and Libel in the Credit Reporting
Context
Some insight into the problems and solutions that may result
from the computerization of the newspaper delivery system can be
gleaned from the experience of another communications industry
that already has undergone sweeping automation - the credit re-
porting business. Commercial credit reporting services, or "credit
83. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text, supra.
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bureaus," are private companies that specialize in collecting and
organizing information about individuals and businesses which
they then offer for sale to financial. institutions, retail merchants,
employers, insurance companies, and other credit suppliers. This
information generally concerns the credit history and character of
potential customers or employees. Since the founding of the first
credit reporting firms in the mid-nineteenth century, this industry
has grown into a network of more than 2,000 agencies, capable of
generating, as of 1967, reports on more than 110 million
Americans."
Traditionally, courts have held that credit bureaus are protected
from tort liability for defamation or invasion of privacy by a quali-
fied privilege when they are requested to and do communicate
their reports to individuals or companies with a legitimate business
interest in the information." This privilege is conditioned on the
good faith of the agency making the report, and a credit bureau is
therefore usually shielded from liability for simple negligence in
circulating erroneous credit reports." If, however, a plaintiff can
demonstrate "actual malice" on the agency's part in addition to
error, then the qualified privilege will be lost and the plaintiff will
be able to recover damages. Early decisions in this area generally
required a showing of actual or express malice, in the sense of ill
will, 7 but in more recent years, courts have begun to apply a defi-
nition to the word "malice" that is very similar to the one utilized
by the Supreme Court in the newspaper libel privilege case, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan." As applied to credit bureaus, malice
84. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, DATABANKS IN A FREE SocIETY - COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING
AND PRIVACY 132 (1972); Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035
(1971). Credit bureaus flourish because credit suppliers want to minimize their business
risks and because they believe that commercial reporting services can provide accurate in-
formation for less expense than they would incur if they attempted to gather it themselves.
85. See Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952); Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785 (1965); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (1953) and Later Case Service
(1981); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1971).
86. Id.
.87. See Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947); Minter v. Brad-
street Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S.W. 668 (1903); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (1953).
88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Actual malice was defined by the Court as "knowledge that [a
statement] is false or . .. reckless disregard for whether it was false or not." Id. at 280. The
Supreme Court of Texas held that the New York Times definition of actual malice was
applicable in a libel action against a credit reporting agency in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1970). Some courts have held that credit bureaus are not
entitled to the protection of the New York Times standard. See Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet,
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in the legal sense may consist of actual ill will, but it also can be
established by showing conduct on the part of the credit agency
that evidences either a reckless disregard for, or a conscious indif-
ference to, the rights of the plaintiff.89 One court found that the
failure of a credit agency to take remedial measures, where it re-
fused either to retract an erroneous report or to issue a corrected
report upon request, was sufficient evidence of malice to uphold a
jury's verdict in a libel action.90
Persons libeled by credit bureau reports generally have asked, as
far as the reported cases demonstrate, only for damages and not
for injunctive relief.1 This is presumably a result of attorneys'
awareness of the dogmatic judicial antipathy to equitable remedies
in libel actions. However, in one recent case in which the issue was
raised, a federal court made it clear that "[g]ranting or denying a
preliminary injunction rests within the discretion of this Court.""
The injunction was not granted, but that was because the credit
reporting agency had deleted the erroneous information from its
files and sent out a corrective report to all subscribers who had
received the libelous material, and the court did not feel it should
limit the defendant's credit reporting any further.98 In a case
where injunctive relief was not sought, a state appellate court up-
held a jury's finding that an automobile manufacturer's credit sub-
sidiary had libeled a buyer when it forwarded incorrect informa-
tion to a credit bureau, "especially," the court said, "when coupled
with a gross failure to take any steps to correct the lies it
transmitted.""
The problem with complete legal dependence upon common law
libel actions and damage remedies in order to provide relief from
erroneous or malicious credit reporting was that such a solution
never anticipated the explosive impact the computer would have
on the collection, organization, transmission, and volume of credit
Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971), but those decisions were based
on findings that the contents of consumer credit reports are not matters of "public interest,"
and the courts did not challenge the use of the Times malice definition itself.
89. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
825 (1965); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W.2d 34 (1961); In re
Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961).
90. Morgan v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 421 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1970).
91. See generally cases cited in Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 776 (1953) and Later Case Service
(1981), and Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1971).
92. Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
93. Id. at 636-37.
94. Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 259 So.2d 768, 770-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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information. As one consumer spokeswoman told a congressional
subcommittee in 1969, "[w]ith the establishment of large comput-
erized data bases, it is no longer difficult, or time-consuming, or
expensive to compile life-long dossiers on all [Americans] . . . and
to make easy access to them."95 By 1967, ninety-seven million
credit reports were being issued annually," and it was apparent
that even a small percentage of errors could involve hundreds of
thousands of persons. Congress responded in 1970 to the phenome-
nal proliferation of computer-generated credit reports by enacting
the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)."
The Act's stated purpose is to require that "consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce for consumer . . . information in a manner which is fair
and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy and proper utilization of such information
. . ."98 The Act specifically limits the purposes for which a con-
sumer credit report may be furnished," and it generally prohibits
the reporting of obsolete information.100 In instances where a con-
sumer disputes the accuracy of the information in his record, the
reporting agency is required to reinvestigate and record the current
status of that information, and if the data is found to be inaccurate
or no longer can be verified the agency must delete that material
from its records.101 In addition, the consumer may request the bu-
reau to notify anyone who has received the incorrect record within
certain specified periods of time that the contested information has
95. Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (Statement of Sarah H. Newman, gen-
eral secretary, National Consumers League) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also
id. at 1-2 (Statement of Senator William Proxmire); id. at 30-31 (Paul Rand Dixon); id. at
94 (Prof. Alan F. Westin); id. at 113, (Erma Angevine, executive director, Consumers Feder-
ation of America).
96. Senate Hearings, supra note 95, at 11a (statement of Virginia H. Knauer, special
assistant to the President for consumer affairs).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
98. Id. § 1681(b) (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976). Obsolete information includes bankruptcies that are more
than 14 years old and any of the following that are more than seven years old: court suits or
judgments, paid tax liens, accounts placed for collection, and records of arrests, indictments,
or convictions, dated from the time of the disposition of the case. These exclusions become
inapplicable, however, if the proposed credit transaction involves a principal of $50,000 or
more, a life insurance policy of $50,000 or more or employment for a salary of $20,000 or
more annually. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. 1681j(a) (1976).
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been removed from its files.102
The FCRA establishes civil liability for either willful' 03 or negli-
gent10 4 noncompliance by either consumer reporting agencies or
users of information who fail to comply with the law's require-
ments, but it does not explicitly sanction injunctive relief. It is ob-
vious, however, that the Act presumes that credit bureaus will take
affirmative action to correct erroneous information, and will, upon
request, make those corrections known to those who previously
have seen the incorrect data. 05 And in the only reported case in
which a plaintiff sought to enjoin dissemination of reports alleged
to violate the FCRA, 0 the court ruled that it had jurisdiction to
grant equitable relief, stating that the defendant's continued dis-
tribution of information on microfilm or microfiche drawn from its
computer data base exceeded the permissible limitations of FCRA
Section 1681b, thus making appropriate "preliminary and probably
final injunctive relief." 0 7
V.
A Comparative Analysis
It must be conceded that the purposes of credit information re-
porting are rather - although not entirely - different from those
of a newspaper. The scope of First Amendment protection for the
two different mechanisms of communication and types of informa-
tion is arguably not the same. This was the attitude of one circuit
court of appeals called upon to decide a challenge to the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act on First Amendment grounds.108 While
acknowledging that the Supreme Court had said, in Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia,09 that commercial speech was entitled to some First
Amendment protection, the Eighth Circuit still ruled that "con-
sumer credit reports are not protected speech . . . under the First
Amendment" and thus could be the subject of congressional regu-
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d) (1976). A person seeking employment may request notification
of anyone who has received the incorrect credit report within the past two years. For all
other purposes, the time limit is six months.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1976).
- 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1976). In neither §§ 1681n nor 1681o are the terms "willful" or
"negligent" defined. Courts are thus left to apply judicial standards in such cases.
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1976).
106. Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Ariz. 1974), aff'd,
524 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
107. 399 F. Supp. at 1096.
108. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
109. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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lation through the FCRA.no Had the court adopted a constitu-
tional balancing approach, however, it might have concluded that
consumer credit reporting was indeed encompassed within the
First Amendment and yet still subject to regulation under the con-
gressional commerce clause power"' in those instances where mal-
ice or negligence resulted in a loss of the credit agency's qualified
privilege.11 2 In the same way, the decisions in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,'" Time, Inc. v. Firestone,1 14 and most recently Her-
bert v. Lando'" have made it apparent that the constitutional pro-
110. 528 F.2d at 833.
111. The Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall have power . . . to reg-
ulate commerce . . . among the several states." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Supreme Court is often faced with situations where it must attempt to strike a bal-
ance between conflicting constitutional clauses, and no one on the Court, with the exception
of the late Justices Black and Douglas, has ever suggested that the First Amendment's blan-
ket assertion that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press," note 24 supra, prohibits all congressional actions taken pursuant to other consti-
tutional authority when the effect of such actions may have an impact upon speech as well.
See Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); U.S. Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
112. Regarding such qualified privileges, one might recall the decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the Supreme Court conceded that the seeking out and
gathering of news is entitled to "some" First Amendment protection, but still held that
newsmen could be required to appear and testify before grand juries. Many federal and
state courts have since ruled that Branzburg actually provides the foundation for a quali-
fied, but no absolute, newsmen's privilege. See cases cited in Comment, The Fallacy of Far-
ber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70
J. CRIM. L. & C. 299 (1979).
113. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See text accompanying note 37, supra. This action was brought
by a prominent Chicago attorney who had represented the family of a youth killed by a
policeman in a civil suit against the officer. The attorney claimed he had been libeled by a
politically right-wing magazine that had published an article about his involvement in the
lawsuit. The Supreme Court held that the attorney's participation in the action against the
policeman did not make him a "public figure" under the New York Times rule even though
the lawsuit was a matter of "public or general interest," and consequently it was not neces-
sary for the attorney to prove New York Times "actual malice" in order to prevail in his
libel action.
114. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See text accompanying note 37, supra. The plaintiff in this
action was a prominent member of Palm Beach society circles and the wife of the heir to the
Firestone rubber fortune. Her husband divorced her and Time magazine reported, inaccu-
rately, that adultery was one of the grounds upon which the divorce was granted. Mrs. Fire-
stone then sued for libel. The Supreme Court held that resort to the courts to obtain a
divorce did not constitute a "public controversy" for constitutional purposes, and it did not
represent the voluntary offering of one's reputation for public scrutiny. For these reasons,
Mrs. Firestone was neither a voluntary, nor an involuntary public figure, and she did not
have to prove New York Times "actual malice" in order to win her libel case.
115. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). In this case, the plaintiff, a former U.S. Army officer who had
gained national prominence during the latter stages of the Vietnam War when he accused
several superior officers of concealing war atrocities, was an admitted public figure. He
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tection extended to news media in libel actions is also by no means
absolute.
With respect to injury and recourse, the private citizen who has
been defamed by the news media is much like the private individ-
ual whose commercial reputation has been unfairly impaired by a
credit reporting agency. Both persons are susceptible to devastat-
ing injury, and as private citizens, both are unlikely to enjoy access
to channels of communication that would effectively enable them
to correct the erroneous or malicious impressions that already have
been circulated about them. Because of their high vulnerability,
the state interest in protecting private individuals is, as Justice
Powell observed in Gertz, correspondingly great."'
This discussion is not meant to imply that the two types of libel
are the same in all respects. Nor is it meant to suggest that Con-
gress could - or would want to - deal with the potential future
problem of interstate libel transported to thousands or even mil-
lions of readers instantaneously by means of a huge computer net-
work by passing a federal defamation law similar to the FCRA.
Drafting such a statute would not be a simple task, and in the con-
text of extremely broad constitutional protection for the tradi-
tional organized press, it is possible that any federal defamation
law would be subject to overbreadth or void-for-vagueness chal-
lenges.' 17 Those considerations aside, however, it must be acknowl-
edged that, since the 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, the United States has had a federal common law of
defamation that does to some extent preempt the traditional state
law in this area."8 Congress has never seen any reason to enact
this federal common law in statutory form. However, automation
of the newspaper delivery system has not yet occurred to any sig-
nificant degree, and computerized libel by the press does not pre-
sent the same problems that automation already had brought to
the credit reporting industry by the late 1960s.
brought a libel action against several people involved in the production of a segment on the
CBS documentary news program "60 Minutes" that questioned the truthfulness of his
charges. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to conduct discovery into
the state of mind of the defendants during their preparation of the program in order to
establish the possible existence of New York Times "actual malice," and that such discovery
did not violate the First Amendment's protection of the editorial process.
116. 418 U.S. at 344, 348.
117. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
118. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, § 118; L. ELDREDGE, supra note 26, § 51.
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If defamation truly does not rise to the level of constitutional
sanctity,119 and if remedies were so tailored as to affect the press
only after publication and not before,120 then logically it seems
that a federal defamation statute would not violate the First
Amendment.' It is, of course, possible that Congress might never
find it necessary to adopt such a law for any number of reasons,
including the obvious political difficulties that such a proposal
would encounter. Regardless of any legislative response, however,
it is the contention of this article that the federal and state courts
will have to be more alert to the problem of the adequacy of reme-
dies in the future era of the telescreen newspaper. Courts have
shown a growing willingness to consider equitable relief in cases
involving consumer credit reporting defamation and non-media li-
bel. Such relief, if maintained within constitutional bounds, might
also be applied to the electronic newspaper as well.
VI.
Conclusion
Experts in both the newspaper and computer industries ac-
knowledge that the telescreen or electronic newspaper, prepared
with the essential and extensive aid of computers and transmitted
onto the home television screen through either the telephone net-
work or the broadcaster's signal, will be the inevitable product of a
119. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text, supra.
120. See notes 56, 76 & 77 and accompanying text, supra. One argument that advocates
of any proposed federal defamation statute would likely encounter is the contention that no
such statute could be so tailored as to affect the press only after publication, because even if
relief were somehow limited to post-publication equities, the "chilling effect" resulting from
the mere existence of such a law would have an inhibiting pre-publication impact upon the
gathering and editing of news. Of course, journalists have always worked with the knowledge
that what they put into print may come back to haunt them through a lawsuit for libel. This
spectre does not appear to have generally slowed the American press, although it might be
possible for journalistic historians to cite specific examples where such a fear resulted in the
quashing of a particular story.
121. Congress could rely on either the commerce clause, see note 111, supra, or the neces-
sary and proper clause for authority to enact a federal defamation statute. Computerized
newspapers, and libelous stories they might contain, would be articles of interstate com-
merce. Under the necessary and proper clause, Congress would be acting under its authority
to legislate in order to carry out the constitutional responsibilities of other departments of
government: in this case, enforcing the Supreme Court's pronouncements on libel found in
such decisions as New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "Congress
shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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spiraling trend toward automation in the newspaper business. Le-
gal scholars also should recognize this likelihood, and should begin
considering what impact it will have on the various tenets of Amer-
ican press law.
In the area of defamation, information from electronic newspa-
per transmission might permit courts to gauge more accurately the
extent of a libel's circulation and thus assist in determining the
proper value of damages to be awarded. A more important issue
that will be raised, however, by the advent of the telescreen news-
paper is the question whether, and to what degree, traditional
damage remedies will remain adequate to compensate victims of
defamation. When stories published years before can be easily
viewed by readers throughout the country at the mere touch of a
few buttons, then both the single publication rule and the already
eroded maxim that courts will not provide equitable relief when
publication is involved may have to be abandoned as obsolete.
A growing number of courts have held in recent years that they
can grant injunctive relief to libel plaintiffs in a variety of contexts,
including trade libels upon property,122 tortious invasions of the
personal right of privacy,M and maliciously erroneous commercial
credit reporting.12 ' The courts also have held that injunctions
against defamation can be secured where non-media defendants
are involved even though the injunctive action may infringe First
Amendment rights.1 25 In such instances, a balancing test has been
applied to weigh the varying values of conflicting constitutional
claims. This balancing approach also must be utilized when the
press is involved as a defendant, but equity cannot be invoked to
prevent initial publication. In order to remain faithful to the com-
mandment of the First Amendment, a court could grant equitable
relief only after publication has taken place.
The answer to this technological and legal problem might be
found, in part, through the technology itself. It will be possible in
the future to change newspaper "morgue" computer tapes in order
to indicate that the story being seen on the screen was, after initial
publication, found by a court of law to be libelous. Other, even
more radical solutions also may be considered, but courts and leg-
islatures will have to tread lightly here to avoid fashioning reme-
122. See notes 58 through 63 and accompanying text, supra.
123. See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
124. See notes 92 and 106 and accompanying text, supra.
125. See notes 63, 69 and 72 and accompanying text, supra.
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dies that otherwise infringe the constitutional freedom of the
press.
If the problem of computer-aided defamation in consumer credit
reporting is treated as being at least somewhat analogous, then it
can be argued that the development of the electronic newspaper on
a nationwide scale might eventually require Congress to provide a
statutory plan of libel relief similar to that embodied in the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act. If defamation is not regarded as quali-
fying for full First Amendment protection, then such a statute will
probably be held constitutional. The more likely forum for the cre-
ation of a legal standard will, however, be the courts, and as com-
puterization increases the potential for libelous harm, the judiciary
will have to demonstrate great imagination, little dogmatism, and a
healthy respect for both a free press and the occasional victim of
its valued reporting.

